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ABSTRACT: In relation to the task of making an expedient selection from the available
loci within the topical potential that strategic manoeuvring envisages for the argumen-
tation stage, this paper proposes a version of topics, which is both inspired to the tradi-
tional doctrine of topics and consistent with the theoretical framing and the
methodological tenets that are proper of modern semantics and current theory of argu-
mentation. The argumentative relevance of communication context in its institutionalised
and interpersonal components is brought to light. Three main aspects are focussed on: the
strong synergy of the topical and the endoxical components in argument construction, the
use of topics in analysis and evaluation of arguments and the heuristic function of topics
in the production process.
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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The topic of strategic manoeuvring, which is per se theoretically
relevant, turns out to be particularly important for those who, like
the author, develop their research in the context of communication
sciences. The integration of the dialectical commitment with a rhetor-
ical dimension corresponds to an extension of focus from a prevail-
ingly analytical and evaluative concern to the acknowledgement of a
speciﬁc feature characterizing argumentative production. Here, the
commitment of reasonableness is combined with a party-bound
attitude. In fact, if some roles in certain actualisations of the critical
discussion demand a rather analytical and evaluative approach (this is
basically the position of the decider in adjudication1 and of the other
ﬁgures of ‘‘thirdness’’ like mediators and arbitrators), the role of the
arguer himself always implies an attempt to prevail, rather than simply
fulﬁlling a critical task. A neutral position is expected from someone
beyond the parties and not from the parties themselves.
The focus on strategic manoeuvring is consistent with the prag-
matic orientation of Pragma-dialectics: argumentation is not simply
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an inferential procedure; it is a (communicative) act embedded in a
cultural-social (historical) context (van Eemeren and Grootendorst,
2004, p. 52). Within this context, each arguer has his own aim and
tries to realize it. Insofar as someone is an arguer, her aim is to
bring her standpoint to victory in the respect and with the aid of a
critical approach (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2002, p. 135).
The focus on strategic manoeuvring reconciles the dialectical and
rhetorical approaches to the argumentative activity, which suﬀered, in
particular in the last centuries, from a ‘‘sharp and infertile ideological
division’’ (ibid., pp. 136–137). But it also fosters the professional
implementation of Argumentation theory: the professional quality
does not simply depend on the correctness of an argumentative strat-
egy (within the tradition of Pragmatics we ﬁnd in this relation the
term felicity), but the success of such a strategy is pursued; by borrow-
ing, again, another particular term from the tradition of Pragmatics,
we could speak of happiness to point at a positive outcome of the
argumentative intervention (Rigotti and Rocci, 2001, p. 50).
Rhetorical involvement is, by the way, precious in social life for vari-
ous reasons. First of all, the desire of winning is not necessarily origi-
nated in the mind of an intentional and perverse manipulator: it can be
rather the sign of a sincere commitment to a certain position, which en-
tails the willingness to ‘‘prove’’ its validity. Moreover, the dignity of the
rhetorical involvement is also implied by the fact that the right to a de-
fender is ensured in all advanced legal systems to each defendant. This
right, which is acknowledged even to manifestly guilty parties, is ex-
plained by the fact that their very reasons are helped to emerge only if
some arguer applies her rhetorical eﬀort to make them prevail. The same
fact justiﬁes that sort of ‘‘faith’’ in the eﬀectiveness of the dialogic ap-
proach to the resolution of diﬀerences of opinion, which underlies the
pragma-dialectical interpretation of reasonableness.2
2. STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING AND THE ARGUMENTUM-VERSION
OF TOPICS
I will now point out those aspects of strategic manoeuvring in relation
to which the Argumentum3 group is developing its contribution.
The role of strategic manoeuvring can be understood only if consid-
ering the speciﬁc opportunities oﬀered to arguers in each stage of criti-
cal discussion for simultaneously saving the dialectical aim of the stage
and their party-bound interests (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2005a).
In each stage, strategic manoeuvring develops along three coordinated
but distinct dimensions: ‘‘making an expedient choice from the options
constituting the topical potential’’, i.e. from ‘‘the set of relevant alter-
native moves available to a party in that stage of the resolution
520 E. RIGOTTI
process’’; ‘‘selecting a responsive adaptation to audience demand’’; and
‘‘exploiting the appropriate presentational devices’’ (ibid., p. 29). Our
recent research within Argumentum at the University of Lugano has
concentrated on a particular phase of strategic manoeuvring, which
concerns topical potential within the argumentation stage. This phase
envisages the choice of a speciﬁc line of defence of ones standpoint
‘‘that involves a selection from the available loci that best suits the
speaker or writer’’ (ibid., p. 30). The tradition of argumentation stud-
ies has devoted signiﬁcant attention to this task through the elabora-
tion of a doctrine of topics (see Aristotelis, 1949, 1958, 1959; Hispani,
1947; Hubbel, 1949; Quintiliani, 1970; Stump, 2004). This doctrine is,
in fact, ultimately aimed at constructing an ‘‘argument generator’’ that
should provide the arguer with a ‘‘euporia’’ (richness) of arguments
supporting his standpoint.
Within Argumentum, we propose (Rigotti and Greco, 2006) a
model of topics that, though inspired by the ancient and medieval
tradition, taking into account the developments of modern semantics
and pragmatics, is strictly connected with the theoretical and
methodological debate characterizing the contemporary theory of
argumentation.4
The system of topics included in Argumentum represents a sort of
engine of this production-oriented model, as it simulates the process of
generation of relevant arguments. A diagram, which an indeed vague
likeness induced us to name ‘‘Fishbone’’, and which plays a relevant
role in orienting users navigation, represents the constitutive compo-
nents of the model in the framework of their relationships. As the
Fishbone model privileges the point of view of production of a single
argumentative intervention, it needs to be correlated to the general
framework of critical discussion. (Figure 1)
In order to situate topics within Argumentum, I will brieﬂy illus-
trate the main components of the ‘‘ﬁshbone’’ model.
The ﬁrst rectangle is mainly devoted to the communicative context
of an argumentative intervention; context, in fact, dictates conditions
and aims of the argumentative intervention, and all its relevant factors
(from the subjects involved, to the interaction ﬁeld - social context of
interaction -, and to the communicative practice) must be taken into
account in order to design a rhetorically and dialectically adequate
argumentative intervention.
As the notion of communication context is both hugely relevant and
considerably complex, Rocci and I have devoted to it an analysis that
has been expounded in a speciﬁc paper (Rigotti and Rocci, 2007).
Here, it might be useful to brieﬂy outline the results of such an analysis,
starting with a scheme representing the articulation of this notion:
(Figure 2)
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Communication context is constituted by two relevant dimensions,
which can be characterized as institutionalised and interpersonal
respectively.
1. The institutionalised dimension has been focused on within the pragma-
dialectical approach (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2005b) through the
notion of activity type, introduced by Levinson (1978). The complex
notion of activity type includes in turn two components that, in our
opinion, deserve to be kept distinct.
1.1. The ﬁrst component is represented by the interaction ﬁeld, i.e. by that
piece of social reality (in Searles (1996) terms) where the argumentative
interaction takes place. The interaction ﬁeld is deﬁned by speciﬁc
(hierarchically organized) shared goals, which all the interagents share
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Figure 2. The communication context.
Figure 1. The ‘‘ﬁshbone’’ model of argumentative intervention.
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beyond their individual goals, and which deﬁne the interagents
mutual commitments. For instance, a business is distinguished from
other kinds of institution (hospitals, universities...), because its main
shared goal is making a proﬁt.
1.2. The shared goal which is pursued by the interaction ﬁeld is de iure
the ﬁnal aim of all the institutional interactions occurring in the
interaction ﬁeld itself. The interaction ﬁeld operates through a series
of interaction schemes which aim at the fulﬁlment of the shared goals.
Interaction schemes presuppose and entail corresponding communica-
tive practices or, properly, communicative interaction schemes (like
deliberation, negotiation, consulting, problem-solving, adjudication,
mediation...), which, at least in some cases, also constitute proper
jobs. For instance, a business needs to make strategic decisions about
its ﬁnancial activities in order to reach its main goal of making
proﬁt; often, the process of decision-making is made through the
deliberation by a group of people. But the communicative practice of
deliberation is also applied in other interaction ﬁelds (such as a city
council, a university department, etc.). The communicative practice is
constituted as an interaction scheme aiming at fulﬁlling the shared
goals (the main one and the subordinate ones) deﬁned by the interac-
tion ﬁeld; the practice involves rules of interaction and speciﬁc com-
municative and non-communicative tools that have been established
in the history of the practice itself.
The implementation of interaction schemes within interaction ﬁelds
generates a network of roles that are linked to each other through
correspondent communicative ﬂows.
2. The roles that are thus generated are ‘‘embodied’’ by implementing sub-
jects that can be individual or collective. In relation to implementing
subjects, the relevance of another component of context arises: the
interpersonal dimension. This second component has actually to do with
the human factor of context. An implementing subject is not to be
understood as a simple ‘‘ﬁller’’ of the institutional role, endowed with
the required competences: indeed, for each real (individual or collec-
tive) implementing subject, the subjective dimension always exceeds the
institutional role. The subject maintains his or her own interests and
goals, which may be congruous with the role itself, or may be conﬂict-
ing with it. It is, indeed, a typical case of agency relationship.5
In the interpersonal dimension two types of interpersonal solidarity
take place. The ﬁrst one concerns the relationships between individu-
als: living and working together within the same interaction ﬁeld origi-
nates various types of stories, in which experiences are shared and
relationships established; such stories may also inﬂuence the institu-
tional dimension. The second type of solidarity concerns the particular
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link of individuals ‘‘belonging’’ to the community, which creates
myths, rites and models (Cantoni and Di Blas, 2006, pp. 233–237); in
other words, the proper culture of the interaction ﬁeld.
The relevance of communication context to the argumentation strat-
egy is justiﬁed by several reasons:
• Within context the issue emerges in relation to which the diﬀerence of
opinion generating the standpoints arises;
• Context is the primary source for deﬁning the strategies in the opening
stage;
• Context provides arguers with that explicit or implicit information
protocol from which many proper endoxa are drawn.
The second rectangle of the ﬁshbone model is explicitly inspired by
strategic manoeuvring, as it is fully devoted to the design of argumenta-
tive strategies. Two strictly complementary dimensions are considered:
the critical and the relational ones. Each of them oﬀers the possibility of
an interdisciplinary enrichment. The critical dimension naturally refers
to logic,6 which is expected to facilitate the assessment of the inferential
validity of argumentative procedures. The relational dimension, moving
from the Aristotelian notions of pathos and ethos, largely corresponds to
the second level of strategic manoeuvring (adaptation to audience
demand). In particular, it could be proﬁtably connected with those
investigations in social psychology that are devoted to persuasive eﬀec-
tiveness of argumentative strategies (Petty et al., 1983; Petty and Caciop-
po, 1986). The main component of this rectangle clearly coincides with
topics, which oﬀers a tool for managing the topical potential, i.e. the set
of relevant alternative moves within the argumentation stage. The model
of topics worked out in Argumentum will be focused in the following of
this paper.
The third rectangle concerns the communicative instrumentation
that ‘‘dresses up’’ the argumentative strategy. This dimension is strictly
connected to the presentational devices within strategic manoeuvring
and articulates this dimension into the arrangement of the arguments
in a rhetorically eﬀective order (dispositio), stylistic choices at the
linguistic level (wording or elocutio), and non-verbal communication,
including body-language (actio), and other presentational techniques
(like graphics, possible audio-visual supports, and so on).
Finally, the fourth rectangle intends to represent the auto-critical
reﬂection which needs to be developed after performing the argumen-
tative intervention within an actual argumentative discussion, in order
to improve ones argumentative practice by learning from experience.
The problem of fallacious argumentation strategies of course aﬀects
all of the three last rectangles.
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I will now consider topics, more speciﬁcally, being the kernel of the
Fishbone model, and particularly relevant to the point of view of stra-
tegic manoeuvring in the argumentation stage. Indeed the system of
topics plays a crucial role with regard to the three main functions of
the model:
• Analysing argumentative interactions by identifying the inferential
processes they activate;
• Evaluating the dialectical and rhetorical eﬀectiveness of argumentative
discourses;
• Supporting the planning and construction of argumentative interven-
tions by oﬀering a rich toolkit of alternative argumentative instru-
ments. By the way, this last function signiﬁcantly corresponds, in the
argumentation stage, to the endeavour of strategic manoeuvring.
This component of Argumentum consists of two main parts, each
one of which is in turn subdivided into several sections.
The former part is devoted to the theoretical framework and the
analytical instruments necessary to face topics. Firstly, a deﬁnition of
some key notions of topics is proposed and discussed. Secondly, a rel-
evant section is devoted to the use of various semantic instruments for
establishing the ontology of the standpoint in its syntagmatic and par-
adigmatic dimensions and its modal status (see the borderline between
what is already ascertained and what is problematic, Rigotti and Gre-
co, 2006). Finally, the inferential structure of a locus is analyzed by
focusing on the maxims arising from diﬀerent knots of this ontology
(hooking points) and on the endoxa they evoke.
The latter part outlines the argument generator, which includes a
taxonomy of loci, and the presentation of one or more maxims arising
from each locus, with their application to speciﬁc arguments by
mapping maxims onto the information protocol oﬀered by the context.
(Figure 3)
The model has been more systematically illustrated in other occasions
(Rigotti and Greco, 2006; Rigotti, 2007). Here, I will limit myself to the
presentation of its fundamental traits; in particular I shall focus on the
relationship between the argument choice and the communicative con-
text within which the argumentative intervention takes place.
3. DEFINITION OF SOME KEY NOTIONS
I will start deﬁning the key notions our model of topics is based on:
topics, locus, endoxon, hooking point, maxim, argument.
Traditionally, topics indicates a systematic method of ﬁnding argu-
ments. Aristotle identiﬁes it with ‘‘a method according to which we are
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able to put forward arguments about any standpoint (problema) start-
ing from propositions which have already been accepted (ex endoxon)’’
(Topics, 100a 1 see Aristotelis, 1958). Now, as topics and, more in
general, rhetoric were considered in antiquity as ‘‘technai’’, i.e. as arts
and not as sciences, their theoretical purpose was not put in the fore-
ground. In order to emphasise the scientiﬁc nature of topics, as re-
quired by its connection with argumentation theory, we focus on its
theoretical commitment by adopting the following deﬁnition: Topics is
the component of argumentation theory by which ideally all7 (theoreti-
cally possible) relevant arguments in favour and against any standpoint
are generated by specifying their inferential structure through a system
of loci (Rigotti and Greco, 2006).
Two fundamental notions are involved by this deﬁnition: standpoint
and locus.
A standpoint is a statement (simple or complex) for whose accep-
tance by the addressee the arguer intends to argue.
Two remarks are necessary.
Firstly, a standpoint is a particular type of statement which (1) did
not yet receive a shared justiﬁcation (neither by evidence nor by a pre-
vious inference); (2) is bound to a commitment of immediate justiﬁca-
tion by an inferential procedure (it is candidate to ﬁgure as a
conclusion).
Secondly, a standpoint is always a statement, even though it can be
subject to diﬀerent modalities and thus provide logical equivalencies to
other types of utterance (pieces of advice, orders, questions, and so
on).
Being the basic constituent of our model, the notion of locus plays
a fundamental role. A locus8 is a ‘‘sub-generator’’ of argumentative
procedures consisting of one or more maxims in the form of truth
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Figure 3. The main components of topics.
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conditions that bind the truth value of the standpoint to the accep-
tance by the considered public of propositions referring to speciﬁed
aspects of the ontology of the standpoint.
It is worth noticing that the inferential process cannot be activated
if the maxim is not combined (crossed) with propositions that have
already been accepted by the considered public, as they typically corre-
spond to opinions that are considered within the community. This
component of the argumentative procedure was named by Aristotle
endoxon: ‘‘what is already within the shared opinion’’. It is interesting
to directly quote, in this relation, the deﬁnition given by Aristotle
(Topics, 100b. 21, see Aristotelis 1958): endoxa are opinions that are
accepted by everyone or by the majority, or by the wise men (all of
them or the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of
them)’’. A modern translation could be: ‘‘an endoxon is an opinion
that is accepted by the relevant public or by the opinion leaders of the
relevant public’’.
In the above-proposed deﬁnition of locus, the notions of hooking
point and maxim become relevant:
The aspect of the standpoint that the maxims of a certain locus
refer to represents the hooking point of the locus to the standpoint and
gives the name to the locus itself.
Maxims are implications establishing a connection between the
truth value of a hooking point and a standpoint of the form p ﬁ q,
that generate inferential processes; each inferential process deﬁnes,
within the locus, the form of a subclass of arguments that are pro-
duced in connexion with proper endoxa. All the maxims of the same
locus share the same hooking point to the standpoint.
Finally, we arrive at the deﬁnition of argument: we consider an
argument as the actual application of a maxim to one or more proper
endoxa, thus deducing the standpoint from the maxim for a certain
public that shares the above-mentioned endoxa.
Let us consider an example that could help us recognize the rela-
tions between these last key notions of topics. If we consider the locus
from the ﬁnal cause, we observe that all the arguments it generates
origin from a particular aspect of the standpoint: the ﬁnal aim of the
action referred to by the standpoint. But, depending on the presence
or absence of a ﬁnality (motive), it is, ﬁrst of all, possible to state whe-
ther the situation the standpoint refers to is an actual action or rather
an event, e.g. an involuntary behaviour (‘‘You just stepped on my
foot!’’ ‘‘I didnt do it on purpose!’’). However the same locus can
generate other kinds of arguments. Let us suppose that the nature of
an action has already been deﬁned and that the arguers aim is to
determine whether this action can be described as murder or as a
case of self-defence. The argumentative process will develop in the
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following way: if it has been ascertained from a number of circum-
stances that the victim was evidently not capable of causing serious
damages to anybody, then the locus from the ﬁnal cause allows
concluding that the hypothesis of murder is true. Both procedures, as
diﬀerent as they may be, are established in relation to the same hook-
ing point: the ﬁnality of the action. It is clear that within the same
locus, i.e. by referring to the same moment of the semantic-pragmatic
structure (ontology) of the standpoint, diﬀerent kinds of argument can
be found. Their variety depends on two mutually connected factors:
(1) the border which is posed in the standpoint between what is already
ascertained and what is still disputed (in the ﬁrst example, the status
of action has not yet been ascertained and is thus being disputed,
whereas in the second example it is taken for granted and what is dis-
puted is the quality of the action);
(2) the speciﬁc maxim. For example, within the locus of the ﬁnal cause,
referring to a diﬀerent border between ascertained and disputed, we
have found two diﬀerent maxims: (1) If a behaviour does not have a
ﬁnal cause, it cannot be deﬁned as action in a strict sense; (2) If for
an action, the ﬁnal cause that is pretended is evidently meaningless or
incompatible with the actual circumstances, another ﬁnal cause must
be identiﬁed.
4. TAXONOMY OF LOCI
The taxonomy of loci proposed in Argumentum is not illustrated in
detail here; I will limit myself to outline it concisely and mention other
presentations (Rigotti, 2007; Rigotti and Greco, 2006)
In the Medieval literature on topics, loci were distinguished, accord-
ing to their proximity to the standpoint, into intrinsic, extrinsic and
middle loci.
In general, the basic distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic loci
can be found in Cicero: ‘‘alii in eo ipso de quo agitur haerent, alii assu-
muntur extrinsecus’’ (M.T.Ciceronis, Topica, see Hubbel, 1949) Our
taxonomy is however closer to the typology formulated by Themistius
and followed by Boethius (De topicis diﬀerentiis, see Stump, 2004): (1)
the loci taken from those factors that are directly established by the
standpoint (vel ex ipsis sumantur quae in quaestione sunt constituta), (2)
those loci that are taken from the outside (vel extrinsecus ducantur), and
(3) those loci which can be found almost on the borderline between the
previous two (vel quasi in conﬁnio horum posita vestigentur).
Moreover, the intrinsic loci include not only those things which are
referred to in the standpoint, but also those that condition the state
of aﬀairs denoted by the standpoint, and that either follow it or come
together with it. They correspond to all those aspects that constitute
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the possible fragment of the world expressed in the standpoint or that
coexist with it. Exploiting the notion of syntagm, introduced in
modern linguistics to mean the set of relations in praesentia, we speak
of syntagmatic loci to indicate all the classes of arguments that refer to
aspects that are ontologically linked to the standpoint, either directly
or indirectly, such as the extensional relations of terms, dependent on
the semantic content, on the hierarchical taxonomy of predicates, on
the relationship between the whole and its constituent parts; included
in this group of loci are also the classes of arguments which assume as
their hooking point those pieces of world, traditionally called causes,
eﬀects, circumstances and concomitances, that condition the state of
aﬀairs the standpoint refers to.
In Themistius and Boethius (ibid.) tradition, the description of the
extrinsic loci, on the other hand, is undoubtedly more vague: ‘‘Extrin-
sic loci are not so ‘‘separate’’ and detached as to prevent the vision,
from a certain perspective, of what constitutes the situation concerned
by the standpoint’’ (Non sunt ita separata atque disiuncta, ut non ali-
quo modo quasi e regione quadam ea quae quaerentur aspiciantur).
When considering the loci included within the extrinsic ones (similar-
ity, opposition, major-minor, termination and setting up), it is none-
theless quite clear that they correspond to those relations in absentia
(of alternativeness) deﬁned by modern linguistics as paradigmatic.
Thus we speak of paradigmatic loci referring to classes formed by
arguments that are based on paradigmatic relations, both of opposi-
tion (see the notion of semantic paradigm in Rigotti and Greco, 2006)
and of analogy (similarity).
As regards the loci medii (also indicated as mixti), they are charac-
terized by being on the borderline (in conﬁnio) between extrinsic and
intrinsic ones. The name complex loci seemed to be more adequate to
account both for the frequent contamination they show between para-
digmatic and syntagmatic loci, and for the frequent inclusion of extra-
discursive elements. A prime example of this should be considered the
locus from authority, which, pointing to the moral and\or cognitive
quality of the ‘‘producer’’ of the message, refers ﬁrst of all to the syn-
tagmatic locus from agent as a subtype of the locus from eﬃcient cause;
nevertheless, the aspect taken into consideration does not refer to the
content of the standpoint but to the communicative situation in which
the standpoint is being discussed. Among the complex loci can be
considered also the ‘‘ad’’ arguments, having in general a dialectically
deviant nature. Derivates and conjugates are more rhetorical than
dialectical: derivates refer to the so called etymological ﬁgure (‘‘If he is
an entrepreneur, he should stick to managing enterprises and not pre-
tend...’’) and derive indeed their argumentative power from semantic
implications of diﬀerent nature and diﬀerent inferential strength (as in
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our case, it is frequently a matter of the relation between the status of
a certain being and its tasks);9 conjugates instead draw on the seman-
tic relations implied by morphological patterns (‘‘Those who fought
against us have lost, then those who will ﬁght against us will loose’’)
and activate one or more syntagmatic or paradigmatic loci.
We propose the following diagram to represent the taxonomy of
loci, where the three domains of syntagmatic, paradigmatic and com-
plex loci appear with their articulations: (Figure 4)
5. TOPICS AS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TOPICAL POTENTIAL IN THE
ARGUMENTATION STAGE: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH
Within this paper, as said, I concentrate on the topical potential in the
argumentation stage. In the adopted deﬁnition, an argument is an
Figure 4. Taxonomy of loci.
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actual application of a maxim to one or more proper endoxa, inferring
the standpoint from the maxim for a certain public that shares such
endoxa; my hypothesis is that, in relation to the endoxical component,
the communication context of the argumentative interaction represents
a rich source of loci. In the following, I will bring some examples
where this relevance clearly emerges.
5.1. A Happy Experience of Strategic Manoeuvring
In the ﬁrst example, the only one I shall analyse in detail here, the
context is represented by a particular type of institution, and the prac-
tice is a quasi-negotiation for settling an initial institutional conﬂict.
Presentational techniques are, by the way, signiﬁcant and a successful
case of strategic manoeuvring is exempliﬁed. For me personally, it is
also the occasion to remember a dear friend, the former director of the
Department of Education and Culture of Canton Ticino, Giuseppe
Buﬃ.10
The argument concerned is based on a paradigmatic locus; this
locus belongs to the general class of analogies, together with the
loci from likeness and from diﬀerence: the locus from isomorphism.
This argument is drawn from the contemporary history of Italian
Switzerland: in 1996, when the University of Lugano was founded and
Giuseppe Buﬃ presented the unexpected novelty to the representatives
of the Cantons with an older university tradition, in fact he exploited
the locus from isomorphism to back an ex post facto announcement:
‘‘It is true: the Canton of Ticino never discussed its project of building a
university with the Confederates, but it decided and planned its realiza-
tion and only then they made the announcement. However, exactly the
same happens when a young couple wants to have a child: they conceive
and then run to announce it to their parents’’.
An adult son and an adult daughter, when building a new family,
though still strongly bound to their family of origin, are themselves
responsible for their own choices. So Ticino, adult son of the Confed-
eration, consciously deciding, gives birth to a new university and only
then makes the announcement to the ‘‘parent-cantons’’.
In this case, the simile rests on an accepted isomorphism of the two
systems. Two conditions are entailed by an isomorphism: (1) there is a
bijective mapping between the two systems (there is one and only one
element of the second system corresponding to each element of the
ﬁrst one) and (2) if in the ﬁrst system a relation R holds between
the two elements, in the second one an analogous relation R holds
between the correspondent elements.
In the considered example, the argumentation refers to an accepted
isomorphism between the enlarged family and the Swiss Confedera-
tion. On the one hand, in this isomorphism the parents (the families of
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origin) correspond to the older cantons – cantons having a consolidate
university tradition – while the Ticinese community corresponds to the
young couple; on the other hand, the responsibility-bound autonomy
of the young couple towards their parents is analogous to the respon-
sibility-bound autonomy of Ticino towards the older cantons. The
maxim activated by this argument establishes in general that, given
such an isomorphism, if, P holds for two members of one system, P is
expected to hold for the correspondent members of the other system.
Thus, if a certain behaviour is legitimate among certain members of
the enlarged family, an analogous behaviour is legitimate, in analo-
gous circumstances, also for the correspondent members of the Swiss
Confederation: as the young couple does not usually communicate the
plan of conceiving a baby to the parents, but the announcement is
made ex post facto, so Ticino is expected to communicate the founda-
tion of a new university to the older cantons only after having already
given life to the new institution. The following synergic representation
highlights the diﬀerent components and the steps of the argument sup-
porting Buﬃs unexpressed standpoint (it has been natural for the
youngest canton not to have announced the plan of opening a university
before the decision had been made): (Figure 5)
If two systems are 
isomorphic, and a certain 
behaviour between two 
elements of the first system 
is natural, an analogous 
behaviour between the 
correspondent elements of 
the second system is natural.  
In the system of the broadened family, adult 
children are responsible and therefore 
autonomous when making their personal 
decisions, though maintaining a relation of 
intimacy and familiarity  with their parents 
Having a baby (an act of love) is 
an autonomous decision 
pertaining to adult children 
Adult children are expected not to  
discuss the decision of having a baby with their 
parents, and are expected, once it is on its way, to 
keep up family ties by running and making the 
announcement. 
Minor Premise A 
Maxim 
First Conclusion A
The system of Swiss Confederation is 
isomorphic with the system of  
enlarged family, where Ticino and the older 
confederate cantons correspond to adult children 
and their parents respectively. 
Creating a new university, Ticino has 
made an autonomous decision 
typically pertaining to a Canton and 
corresponding to the decision of 
having a baby
Minor Premise B 
Ticino was expected to behave towards 
the confederate cantons in the same way 
as a young couple wanting to have a baby 
behaves towards the families of origin 
First Conclusion BMinor Premise
Endoxon A
Final Conclusion 
Endoxon B
Ticino’s behaviour - deciding autonomously on the creation of its 
university, and then announcing it promptly to the confederate cantons - is 
natural
Figure 5. Representation of of Buﬃs argument showing the synergy of the topical and
endoxical components. Minor premises are connected to the endoxa working as their
major premises through a conjunction relation. The same relation connects the ﬁrst
conclusions A and B.
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Our analysis turns out to show that the inferential process at the
basis of this argumentation is quite complex. The inferential struc-
ture of the argument consists of three diﬀerent inferential proce-
dures, one of which assumes a maxim of the locus from
isomorphism as its major premise, whereas the other two assume as
many endoxa as their major premises. Let us start considering the
syllogism based on the maxim: in order to reach the desired conclu-
sion, it is necessary to assume a complex minor premise, corre-
sponding to the conclusions of two endoxa considering the system
of a family, on the one side, and the family-like structure of the
Swiss Confederation, on the other side:
1. Adult children are not expected to discuss the decision of having a
baby with their parents, and are expected, once it is on its way, to keep
up family ties by running and making the announcement.
2. Within the isomorphic system of Switzerland, Ticino was in an analo-
gous position towards the older Cantons.
These statements need in turn to receive a justiﬁcation, which can be
obtained respectively from two other inferences that are intertwined and
combined with the inferential process of the maxim (originated by the
locus). Such inferences are constituted by syllogistic structures with end-
oxa (endoxon A and B respectively in the diagram), in the place of the
major premises. In the place of the minor premises, there are more spe-
ciﬁc propositions (minor premises A and B in the diagram), linking the
subjects of the endoxa (‘‘adult children’’ and ‘‘Ticino’’respectively) to
the terminus medius11 (in A ‘‘responsible and autonomous in decisions of
ones competence’’; in B: ‘‘making a decision of creating a university is
autonomous analogously to the decision of making a baby’’), and thus
deriving the First Conclusions A and B. The ﬁrst conclusions ‘‘prove’’
that a certain aspect of the standpoint (Ticinos behaviour towards its
confederates) has a certain property (being analogous to adult children
behaviour towards parents in relation to the decision of having a baby),
which is exactly what the maxim ‘‘lacks’’ in order to generate the ﬁnal
conclusion. The small curved arrows in the diagram represent the fact
that the ﬁnal conclusions are exploited together as minor premise associ-
ated to the maxim for generating the ﬁnal conclusion.
Such an argument does not base its inferential strength simply on
the locus from isomorphism, but in the degree of reliability of the iso-
morphism between a family and the Swiss Confederation (endoxon B),
and in the degree of reliability of the endoxon concerning the behav-
iour of a young couple (endoxon A). Whereas the endoxon A refers to
a generally shared connection between responsibility and autonomy of
decisions, and shows a certain strength, the endoxon B is strictly
connected to the institutionalised structure of the interaction ﬁeld,
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which is constituted, in this case, by the Swiss Confederation. Notice
that the minor premise B refers both to a juridical feature of the spe-
ciﬁc interaction ﬁeld concerned and to its cultural identity, and does
not come from the inferential scheme of the locus, as it is a datum
emerging from the actual context of interaction.
The awareness of the Swiss cantons of forming a family-like
community is clearly evoked: in relation to this component, Buﬃs
argument may at least partially sound as a warning (Of course, none of
you would doubt that we are a family!). And this argumentation can
easily develop into other possible moves: the newborn university is, in
this case, the little grandchild of the elder Swiss universities and must
therefore be recognized and loved.
Such an example presents the application of a locus which is
strictly connected both to the institutionalised and to the interper-
sonal dimensions of the Swiss nation. On the one hand, Swiss fed-
eralism is evoked with its juridical implications (each canton, in
fact, has formally the right to open a university); on the other
hand, the feeling of willingly belonging to the Swiss community is
activated through the metaphor of the enlarged family. We could
also notice that the institutional aspect was per se legally suﬃcient
to justify Ticinos behaviour, but the choice made by Buﬃ within
the topical potential allowed him to save and consolidate a cordial
relationship with the other cantons.
Figure 6. Deﬁning the modal status of the standpoint.
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5.2. Other Context-Bound Applications of Loci
Generally speaking, the activation of loci in the construction of an
actual argumentative strategy may either involve both dimensions of
context at the same time, or, alternatively, select endoxa that are
more directly related to the one or to the other dimension. In other
words, a single argument based on a locus might speciﬁcally
evoke the interpersonal dimension only or the institutional dimen-
sion only.
If we take as an example the locus of termination and setting up,
which is largely employed in conﬂict resolution practices as media-
tion, it emerges that this locus is often applied by mediators both
to the institutionalised and to the interpersonal commitments be-
tween the conﬂicting parties (see Greco Morasso, forthcoming). A
very frequently employed maxim of this locus can be formulated as
follows: ‘‘If a certain relationship is precious, it should not be inter-
rupted’’. Mediators may hook this maxim to the parties interper-
sonal relationship, if it has been acknowledged to be positive
(friendship, love...) or they might evoke an institutionalised endo-
xon, like the parties involvement in an agency relationship which is
working well, or in a business which makes a good proﬁt, and so
on. Recent research on mediation (Greco Morasso, 2007) has identi-
ﬁed the application of this locus to both dimensions in mediation
sessions. Consider the following two passages, which refer respec-
tively to the interpersonal and to the institutionalised dimensions:
5.3. The Generator as a Discovery Instrument: Towards a Production-
oriented Approach
So far, our generator of loci has presented itself as a theoretical tool
for the analysis and critical evaluation of argumentative texts.
Indeed, topics has been aiming since its origin also at another signiﬁ-
cant purpose: ﬁnding out the relevant arguments for supporting a certain
standpoint. Such a purpose has regained its relevance in contemporary
theory of argumentation: a heuristic eﬀort devoted to ﬁnd out those
arguments that can support ones standpoint is presupposed by the no-
tion of strategic maneuvering as deﬁned by van Eemeren and Houtlosser.
M: [But let me] ask a question here. You know what the value of your friendship is (.) but
ah:: (..) if (..) things didnt work out (..) today (.) will that friendship be lost?
M: ... And all the time, I think, keeping in mind that one of the things you really want to
do is – youve got a golden goose here. And it would be crazy to kill the golden goose. P1:
Thats what Ive tried to tell him.
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Let us see how we could justify a simple standpoint, which could
appear in an advertising campaign: ‘‘This butter is natural’’. It is possi-
ble to say that our standpoint is an assertive proposition, which states
the existence in reality of a certain state of aﬀairs. This proposition is
constituted by a predicate with one argument place, which is occupied
by a nominal structure:
Semantic analysis allows deﬁning the value of natural as a one-place
predicate, presupposing a product of human activity (in particular,
food).12 This is actually the case in our standpoint, where natural is
said of ‘‘this butter’’.
Applying the diagram represented in ﬁgure 6, we get to establish
that the borderline between what is ascertained and what is to be
discussed in the standpoint lies at an evaluative level: in fact, the ques-
tion is whether the butter is natural or not, while it is ascertained at
the ontological and epistemic levels that butter is a product of the hu-
man activity. Clearly if there is a product to advertise, this means that
the action of producing it has actually been performed in the past.
Argumentation has the nature of a discourse that rests on something
which has already been ascertained in order to deﬁne the truth value of a
certain standpoint. Thus, for the evaluation of a standpoint it is neces-
sary to go back to what is certain, i.e. to the unquestionable information
available. If there were no shared information with respect to the stand-
point, the justiﬁcation of the standpoint would be impossible.
However, the latter case seldom occurs. Usually a certain informa-
tion protocol is available, which seems to be referred to the standpoint
in a more or less direct way. If we consider the standpoint in our
example, which can be classiﬁed as an advertisement, we can imagine
that the team responsible for creating an advertising campaign had
been given the following information protocol:
this butter (is) natural
x1 P
a. ... this butter is the one Giovanni (brother of the testimonial) usually buys, and he is a
‘‘gourmet’’
b. ... it is made from fresh alpine milk
c. ... it has been produced following an ancient method
d. ... it is wrapped up in the famous blue packaging
e. ... it has been produced by a reliable dairy
f. ... the dairy-man who made it is Annas uncle, who previously used to produce an
excellent butter on his farm
g. ... it is sold in pats of 200 g each
h. ... it costs 50 CHF per kilo
536 E. RIGOTTI
The heuristic use of the generator of arguments can have two diﬀer-
ent functions, with diﬀerent relevance depending on the context and
on the communicative habits. We will consider two particular situa-
tions that can well represent these two functions.
(1) In the ﬁrst place, the generator works as a device that can
reveal the argumentative power of the available information. This is
done by taking into consideration the information items contained
in the information protocol and by establishing their hooking point
to the standpoint. In other words, the generator is used to deﬁne
for each item of information in the information protocol whether it
is relevant to the standpoint and the reason for its relevance, that is
the nature of its hooking to the standpoint. If we want to build an
argumentative move for the butter advertisement, we ﬁnd in our
information protocol two pieces of information – (d) and (g) – that
are apparently irrelevant with regard to the standpoint.13 All the
other pieces of information are instead possible arguments, because
all of them can be included in a precise locus, thanks to their
hooking to the standpoint: (b) can be included in the locus from
the material cause, (c) in the locus from the instruments, (e) in the
locus from the eﬃcient cause, (f) similarly in the locus from the
eﬃcient cause, though in a more articulated way, (h) in the locus
from implications (the price is implied by the value).
At this point it is a matter of establishing the actual argumentative
power of each one of these possible arguments. This can only be done
by means of the maxim, that we will reformulate here in order to use
it as a heuristic device. The maxim we are going to use and that refers
to the locus from the material cause (suggested, in the example, by
information b), is the following:
‘‘The quality of the product strongly depends on the quality of its material cause’’
In its heuristic function the maxim becomes an instruction, which
can be divided into three parts:
• Identify an endoxon that can show the positive quality of the material
cause.
• Starting from this endoxon, build an enthymematic argumentation that
shows that the quality of the material cause is positive.
• Use the conclusion of the enthymeme as minor premise for the maxim,
thus producing the intended argumentative eﬀect.
In other words, the maxim becomes a heuristic task: it leads to ﬁnd-
ing an endoxon that will guarantee argumentative power to the
selected information. In the case of the locus from the material cause,
the relevant endoxon is the one that states the fact that fresh alpine
milk is a high quality material.
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It is clear that in cases similar to ours, where it is possible to have
more than one relevant piece of information, and where each piece of
information, if adequately included in an argumentative locus, can
generate more than one argumentation in support of the standpoint,
the argumentative strategy must include also a phase of evaluation of
the arguments. This is not only a matter of evaluation of the logical
force and eﬃcacy of each single argument, but also of a compared
evaluation of their relative eﬃcacy, when it is necessary to select from
a certain number of arguments, as well as of including them within a
complex argumentative act (dispositio).
(2) The second function of the generator is to guide the search
for information necessary to support the standpoint. Imagine, for
example, a detective who, in order to establish whether a suspect
had a possible motive for committing the homicide, must know
whether the suspect received economic advantage from the death of
the victim. Quite like the detective, a media analyst could consider
the advantage of checking the reliability of a source, when evaluat-
ing a piece of news. Similarly, a bank, before providing a loan,
must verify the clients capability of sustaining the debt. In this case
it could be appropriate to inquire into the clients preceding behav-
iour towards banks, or into the reliability of the securities he
is putting up for the loan (by checking, for example, that the prop-
erties he is oﬀering as security do not derive from manipulative
leverage activities).
NOTES
1 See Feteris (1987, 1993), who focuses on the role of the judge in the legal process.
2 This ‘‘faith’’ is reﬂected in the so-called ten rules of critical discussion, in particular in the
‘‘freedom rule’’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 208–209).
3 Argumentum is an online course on argumentation theory ﬁnanced by the Swiss Virtual
Campus (see www.argumentum.ch), and realized by the university of Lugano (responsible
for the leading house, Eddo Rigotti, and project coordinator, Sara Greco Morasso), the
University of Neuchaˆtel (Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont), and the University of Geneva (Franz
Schultheis), with the collaboration of the eLab Competence centre (Stefano Tardini) for the
implementation of the online e-learning course.
4 For more details about modern contributions related to topics, in particular to the notion
of argument scheme, see Rigotti and Greco (2006) and Rigotti (2007).
5 Agency theory, a key instrument in explaining many economic and social phenomena, was
deﬁned by Ross (1973) as follows: ‘‘We will say that an agency relationship has arisen between
two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representa-
tive for the other, designated as the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems’’.
The principal delegates a task, which entails a decision making activity, to the agent, and the
agent gets a compensation for it. In such kinds of relationship a problem arises (the agency
problem) because there is no alignment of goals between the two parties, and the agent tends to
act, as much as possible, in her own interest. Examples of agency relationship can be found in
many situations and in diﬀerent contexts of interaction (see Eisenhardt, 1989; Mann, 1997).
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6 An introduction to logic tailored for students in argumentation theory, worked out by
Marco Colombetti, is now being published within Argumentum.
7 The claim of generating all relevant arguments in relation to a certain standpoint might
appear unreasonable. I am not pretending that our model of topics is able to actually
produce all relevant arguments. As a matter of fact, no model of topics could ever be consid-
ered exhaustive in this sense, given that each fragment of reality shows endless aspects that
bear endless relations with endless other fragments of reality... Nonetheless the system of top-
ics generates all relevant arguments as it is expected to assign to each possible argument a
precise inferential structure that is related to the ontology of the standpoint.
8 It is often the case that the term argument is used to indicate both an argument and a
locus. Thus, instead of saying ‘‘argument belonging to the locus from authority’’, one can
speak of ‘‘argument from authority’’.
9 A certain likeliness with the locus from deﬁnition is evident, but an essential diﬀerence
should not be neglected: the locus from deﬁnition necessarily refers to constitutive traits of
the concerned entity, while, very often, the locus from derivates refers to aspects of the con-
cerned entity whose relevance depends on the extent to which their scope covers the whole
concerned entity. In our example, we notice that a professional status like being an entrepre-
neur does not exhaust (is only a part of) the civil status (with related rights and duties) of a
citizen. When resting on a proper locus from deﬁnition, the arguments of this locus acquire
indeed a quite diﬀerent inferential strength: As they are human beings, they are expected to
behave humanly. Evidently, the speciﬁc force of this locus is bound to the wording (is a sort
of poetic proof) and is therefore rhetorical in nature, while its inferential strength depends
each time on the locus that is exploited.
10 Giuseppe Buﬃ (1938–2000) was member of the State Council of the Republic and Canton
of Ticino and Director of the Department of education and culture from 1987 to 2000.
11 Terminus medius (middle term) was named, in the traditional logic, the term occurring in
both premises of the syllogistic structure, that allows the connection between the subject and
the predicate in the conclusion, but which must be absent from the conclusion.
12 Not considering other metaphorical interpretations that, in any case, should be speciﬁed,
it is not possible to say, *This dog is natural, or *In this shop are sold natural clothes.
13 Of course, we can not exclude any possibility of argumentative exploitation of these infor-
mation items; let us image that the colour of the package excites in the audience an emotion
bound to a particular cultural value or that ...
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